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Abstract 
In a continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) system, the information is 
conveyed by coherent state carriers. The quantum continuous variables are sent through a 
quantum channel, where the presence of the eavesdropper adds a white Gaussian noise to 
the transmission. The amount of tolerable noise and loss is a crucial point in CVQKD, 
since it determines the overall performance of the protocol, including the secure key rates 
and transmission distances. In this work, we propose the adaptive multicarrier quadrature 
division (AMQD) modulation technique for CVQKD. The method granulates the Gaus-
sian random input into Gaussian subcarrier continuous variables in the encoding phase, 
which are then decoded by a continuous unitary transformation. The subcarrier coherent 
variables formulate Gaussian sub-channels from the physical link with strongly diverse 
transmission capabilities, which leads to significantly improved transmission efficiency, 
higher tolerable loss, and excess noise. We also investigate a modulation-variance adap-
tion technique within the AMQD scheme, which provides optimal capacity-achieving 
communication over the sub-channels in the presence of a Gaussian noise. 
 
Keywords: continuous-variable quantum key distribution, adaptive multicarrier quadra-
ture division, AMQD modulation, Gaussian modulation, quantum Shannon theory. 
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1  Introduction 
Continuous-variable (CV) quantum key distribution (QKD) systems allow for the establishment 
of an unconditionally secure quantum communication over the current standard telecommunica-
tion networks. CVQKD systems possess several benefits and advantages over the DV (discrete 
variable) protocols, since they do not require specialized devices or unreachable special require-
ments in an experimental scenario [11-18]. CVQKD systems are based on continuous variables 
such as Gaussian random position and momentum quadratures in the phase space. The Gaussian 
modulated coherent states are transmitted over a noisy quantum channel, where the presence of 
an eavesdropper adds a white Gaussian noise to the transmission. Since CVQKD schemes were 
developed and introduced just a few years ago, there are still many open questions regarding the 
optimal encoding scheme. A Gaussian modulation is a robust and easily applicable finding in a 
practical scenario, and allows for the implementation of the protocol in the experiment; however, 
CVQKD is still very sensitive to the imperfections of the transmission and the practical devices. 
The performance of the protocol is strongly determined by the excess noise of the quantum chan-
nel, and the transmittance parameter of the physical link (specifically, the Gaussian noise of the 
quantum channel models the eavesdropper’s optimal entangling cloner attack [2-3], [11-18], and 
the channel is referred to as a Gaussian quantum channel). Since the amount of tolerable loss and 
the excess noise are central parameters from the viewpoint of the running of CVQKD, it would be 
very desirable to make some optimization steps in the encoding and decoding process to override 
the current limitations and to improve the quality of the quantum-level transmission. Our aim is 
to provide a solution to this problem by introducing the adaptive multicarrier quadrature division 
(AMQD) modulation technique for CVQKD, which can be applied both in one-way and two-way 
CVQKD to increase the tolerable loss and excess noise. In traditional telecommunications, OFDM 
(orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing) is a well-known and widely applied technique for 
improving the bandwidth efficiency over noisy communication networks [6-10]. In an OFDM 
scheme, the information is encoded in multiple carrier frequencies, and its main advantage over 
single-carrier transmission is that the subcarrier-based transmission can attenuate and overwhelm 
the problems of diverse and unfavorable channel conditions. OFDM systems have been admitted 
to be a useful encoding method in traditional networking; however, no similar method exists for 
CVQKD. If a similar solution were available for continuous variables, one could enjoy similar 
benefits in a quantum-communication scenario; however, up to this point no analogous answer 
exists for quantum-level transmission. With this in mind, we introduce the idea of AMQD, which 
works on continuous variables and for which similar benefits can be reached in the process of 
quantum-level information transmission, e.g., in a classical scenario by the application of the 
OFDM. In the standard coding scenario, Alice, the sender, modulates and separately transmits 
each coherent state in the phase space. This standard modulation scheme is referred as single-
carrier modulation throughout, consistent to its traditional meaning. 
The key idea behind AMQD modulation is as follows. Alice, draws a zero-mean, circular 
symmetric complex Gaussian random vector, which is then transformed by the inverse Fourier 
operation. At a given modulation variance, Alice prepares her Gaussian subcarrier CVs, which 
are then fed into the. Bob, the receiver, applies the inverse unitary of Alice’s operation, which 
 3
makes it possible for him to recover the noisy version of Alice’s input coherent states. This kind 
of communication will be referred as multicarrier modulation.  
What are the main advantages of this kind of communication? There are several fine corollar-
ies. First of all, the Gaussian subcarrier CV states sent through the channel, which overall allows 
higher tolerable loss and excess noise at a given modulation variance. Second, the Gaussian quan-
tum channel can be viewed as several parallel Gaussian quantum channels, called sub-channels, 
each dedicated for the transmission of a given subcarrier with an independent, and significantly 
lower noise variance. Third, the information transmission capability of the sub-channels is very 
diverse, depending on the variance of the subcarrier CV, which allows for the development of 
smart adaptive modulation techniques for the proposed multicarrier quadrature division-encoding 
technique. The idea behind this is to use only the “good” Gaussian sub-channels for the transmis-
sion, and to not send any valuable information over the so noisy sub-channels. It is a particularly 
convenient approach, since the result of the adaptive allocation is a better performance of the 
protocol at low SNRs (signal-to-noise ratio) and higher tolerable loss, which are crucial corner-
stones in an experimental CVQKD that operates in practice at very low SNRs. From these, the 
purposes are now clear. We have to find the operation that works on continuous variables and 
outputs the subcarrier quadratures, which can divide the physical Gaussian channel into Gaussian 
sub-channels. We also need the continuous unitary inverse of this operation. If we have it, then 
we have to find an adaptive modulation-variance allocation mechanism, which allows no to send 
valuable information over the very noisy Gaussian sub-channels. Fortunately, these features are 
all included in our AMQD coding scheme. The AMQD modulation granulates Alice’s initial 
Gaussian states into several subcarrier Gaussian CVs, which divide the physical channel into sev-
eral Gaussian sub-channels. Bob applies an inverse continuous unitary operation, which allows 
him to obtain Alice’s initial (noisy) coherent states. The proposed AMQD modulation offers sev-
eral important features, but the main improvement is in the quality of the quantum-level trans-
mission, since the subcarriers allow a more efficient communication over the same quantum chan-
nel at a given modulation variance. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, preliminaries are proposed. Section 3 intro-
duces the multicarrier quadrature division scheme. In Section 4, the adaptive modulation variance 
allocation mechanism is discussed. Section 5 studies the performance of AMQD modulation. Sec-
tion 6 provides the security proof of AMQD against optimal Gaussian collective attacks. Finally, 
Section 7 concludes the results.  
 
2  Preliminaries 
In the standard single-carrier modulation scheme, the input coherent state i i ix pj = +i  is a 
Gaussian state in the phase space  , with i.i.d. Gaussian random position and momentum quad-
ratures ( )
0
20,ix wsÎ  , ( )020,ip wsÎ  , where 02ws  is the modulation variance. The coherent 
state ij  in the phase space   can be modeled as a zero-mean, circular symmetric complex 
Gaussian random variable ( )20,
z
z wsÎ  , with variance 
22
z
zws
é ù= ê úë û , and with i.i.d. real and 
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imaginary zero-mean Gaussian random components, ( ) ( )
0
2Re 0,iz wsÎ  , ( ) ( )02Im 0,iz wsÎ  .  
In the single-carrier scenario, the transmission of this complex variable over the Gaussian quan-
tum channel   can be characterized by the ( )T   normalized complex transmittance variable  
( ) ( ) ( )Re ImT T T= + Î   i ,                              (1) 
where ( )0 Re 1 2T£ £  stands for the transmission of the position quadrature, 
( )0 Im 1 2T£ £  is the transmission of the momentum quadrature, with relation  
( ) ( )Re ImT T=                                              (2) 
by our convention. The ( )0 1T£ £  magnitude of the ( )T   complex variable is  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2Re Im 2 ReT T T T= + = Î                         (3) 
and the squared magnitude of ( )T   is   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2 2Re Im 2ReT T T T= + = Î     ,                    (4) 
where ( ) 20 1T£ £ . Assuming a 0 dB loss, the quadrature transmittance is parameterized 
with ( ) ( ) 1
2
Re ImT T= =   and 
( ) ( ) 2 1T T= =  .                                        (5) 
At a given input x, the channel output y can be expressed as  
( )y T x= + D ,                                             (6) 
where ( )20,sDD Î  , 22sD é ù= Dê úë û , models the Gaussian noise of the quantum channel (also a 
zero-mean, symmetric circular complex Gaussian random variable), with independent quadrature 
components ( )20,x sD Î   , ( )20,p sD Î   .  
This Gaussian quantum channel is equipped with a capacity of  
( ) ( )
22
0
22log 1
T
C w
s
s
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= + ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø
 ,                                       (7) 
where 
0
2
ws  is the modulation variance (single-carrier) of the input Gaussian signal.  
In the multicarrier case, the Gaussian quantum channel is divided into n Gaussian sub-channels 
,i 1 ,i n=   each with an independent noise variance 2
i
s , each for the transmission of a con-
tinuous variable subcarrier ,if  which leads to the output for the i-th sub-channel: 
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( )i i i iy T x= + D , 1i n=  ,                                    (8) 
where ( )iT Î  , ( )20,
i
i sDD Î  , and the resulting transmission capacity is 
( ) ( ) 22 22
1
max log 1 i
i
n
T
i i
C w
s
s" =
æ ö÷ç ÷= +ç ÷ç ÷è øå 
 ,                                  (9) 
where 
0
2 2 21
1 i
n
inw w ws s s== =å  is the average modulation variance of the i-th Gaussian subcarrier 
CV transmitted via the i-th Gaussian sub-channel. 
At this point, the capacity formulas of (7) and (9) require some clarification. Assuming a Gaus-
sian quantum channel, one can find two different capacity formulas for the real dimension and 
the complex dimension. The reason is as follows. The noise is independent on the real and imagi-
nary parts (i.e., on the position and momentum quadratures), and each use of the complex Gaus-
sian channel is in particular analogous to two uses of the real Gaussian channel. From this dis-
tinction, two different types of capacity formulas can be derived for the same Gaussian channel, 
i.e., the real-dimension capacity and the complex-dimension capacity.  
The real dimension capacity of an AWGN is 
( ) ( )
22
0
2
1
22
log 1
T
C w
s
s
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= + ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø
 ,                                    (10) 
while the complex dimension capacity is precisely 
( ) ( ) 22 22log 1 TC ws s
æ ö÷ç= + ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø
 .                                     (11) 
In (11) the use of the complex domain is justified by the fact that circular symmetric complex 
Gaussian random variables will be transmitted through the Gaussian quantum channel.  
The SNR of the channel is  
( ) 22
0
2
SNR
Tws
s= 

.                                              (12) 
For the precise clarification, we will use the complex-domain capacity formula throughout, since 
the coherent state in the phase space is a complex variable, despite the fact that the quadrature 
measurement process will finally lead to the formula of (10).  
 
3  Multicarrier Quadrature Division Modulation 
3.1  Continuous-Variable Quantum Fourier Transform 
In terms of the CV scenario, by a convention the x  position quadrature could be used as a com-
putational basis. We will also do this throughout. (The continuous-variable quantum Fourier 
transformation will be abbreviated as CVQFT.) 
Let the Gaussian variable be 
 6
( )
2
221
2
x
g x e ss p
-
= , ( )20,x sÎ  ,                                (13) 
where ( ) 1g x dx¥-¥ =ò . The Fourier transform of (13) is expressed as 
( )( ) ( ) 2 22F g x G e w sw -= = , ( )20,w sÎ  .                         (14) 
Between the Fourier transform ( )F x  and the inverse Fourier transform function ( )1F w- , the 
connection is as follows [7-8]: 
( ) ( )1 ,xF x F e dww w
¥
- -
-¥
= ò i                                       (15) 
where 
( ) ( )1 1
2
xF F x e dxwpw
¥
-
-¥
= ò i .                                     (16) 
For an n-dimensional Gaussian random vector ( )0,Î gg K , ( )1,, Tng g=g , where Té ùê úë û=gK gg  
is the covariance matrix, the Fourier transform and its inverse: 
( ) ( )1 ,F F e d
¥ ¥ ¥
- - ⋅
-¥-¥ -¥
= ò ò ò g wg w w i                                 (17) 
where ( )0,Î ww K  is a n-dimensional Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix 
Té ùê úë û=wK ww , and  
( ) ( ) ( )1 12 nF F e dp
¥ ¥ ¥
- ⋅
-¥-¥ -¥
= ò ò ò g ww g g i .                               (18) 
 
Proposition 1.  The 2Fs  variance of a Gaussian subcarrier CV if  is the reciprocal of 
0
2
ws , 
2
0
2 1
F
ws
s = , where 
0
2
ws  is the single-carrier modulation variance.   
 
Proof.  
First, we propose the CVQFT operation acting on the continuous variables, and then we rewrite 
it as a zero-mean, circular symmetric complex Gaussian random variable.  
Assuming x  position computational basis, function ( )F ⋅  acts on the coherent input ij  as 
follows [1]: 
( ) ( )i i iF F x pj j j=  ,                                  (19) 
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where  
1
2
px
i ix p dpepj j
¥
-¥= ò i ,                                  (20) 
and 
1
2
px
i ip x dxepj j
¥ -
-¥= ò i                                   (21) 
wavefunctions in the position space x, and momentum space p for the state ij , respectively. 
The notation x y  stands for the inner product [1], which can be rewritten as  
( ) ( )x f x x x dxy y
¥
-¥
¢ ¢ ¢= -ò ,                                 (22) 
where ( )f x x x x¢ ¢- =  and ( )x xy y= . Assuming a complete set of orthonormal wave-
functions { }nj  [1], the arbitrary wavefunction y  is as i in cy j= å , from which 
( ) ( ) ( );q c p u p q dpy
¥
-¥
= ò ,                                      (23) 
where  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
; ,
; , ;
.
c p u p q q
u p q c p u p q dp
f p p c p dp
y
¥
-¥
¥
-¥
=
=
¢ ¢ ¢= -
ò
ò
                                (24) 
The inverse function of (19) is defined as  
( )1 i iF p xj j- = .                                       (25) 
A Gaussian modulated coherent state i i ix pj = +i , where ( )
0
20,ix wsÎ  , ( )020,ip wsÎ   
are the position and momentum quadratures, respectively; can be rewritten as a zero-mean, circu-
lar symmetric complex Gaussian random variable ( )20,
zi
iz wsÎ  , 
22
zi
izws
é ù= ê úë û , as 
i i iz x p= + i ,                                              (26) 
where ( )
0
20,ix wsÎ  , ( )020,ip wsÎ   are i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian random variables. As follows,  
i izj = .                                               (27) 
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The variable i ie z
ji  has the same distribution of iz  for any ij , i.e., i ii i iz e z e zj jé ùé ù é ù= =ê úë û ë ûë û
i i    
and 22
i
iz
zs é ù= ê úë û . The density of iz  is 
( ) ( )
( )2 2 2
2 22 2
0 0
2 2
0 0
1 1
2 2
,
z x pi i i
i i if z e f x p e
s sw w
w wps ps
æ ö÷ç ÷-ç - +÷ç ÷è ø
= = = ,                       (28) 
where 2 2i i iz x p= +  is the magnitude, which is a Rayleigh random variable with density 
( )
2
22
2
, 0
zi
i zi
zi
z
i if z e z
sw
ws
-
= ³ ,                                      (29) 
while the 2 2 2i i iz x p= +  squared magnitude is exponentially distributed with density 
( )
2
2
2
2 21 , 0
zi
zi
zi
i if z e z
sw
ws
-
= ³ .                                     (30) 
The i-th subcarrier CV is defined as  
( ) ( )1IFFTi i i iz F z df -= = = ,                               (31) 
where IFFT stands for the Inverse Fast Fourier Transform, and subcarrier continuous variable 
if  in (31) is also a zero-mean, circular symmetric complex Gaussian random variable 
( )20,
i
i d
d sÎ  , 22
i
id
ds é ù= ê úë û , i ii d dd x p= + i , where ( )20,i Fdx wsÎ  , ( )20,i Fdp wsÎ   are 
i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian random variables, and 2
Fws  is the variance of the Fourier transformed 
Gaussian signal. 
The inverse of (31) results the single-carrier CV from the subcarrier CV as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1CVQFTi i i i iF d F F z zj f -= = = = ,                  (32) 
where CVQFT  is the continuous-variable QFT operation.  
Let us to derive the Fourier transform of the Gaussian input [7-8]. First, we rewrite (28) in the 
position basis x as ( )
2
2
2
0
1
2
x
ag x e
wps
-
= , where 
0
2 22a ws= . Then, the Fourier transformed signal 
( )G p  is precisely evaluated as 
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( )( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
2
0
2
2
2
0
2
2
2
0
22 2
24
2
0
22
22 2
24
2
0
2 2
0
2
2 2
0 0
1 1
2 2
1 1
2 2
1 1
2 2
1 1
2 2
1 1
2 2
1 1 1 1
2 22 2
.
x
a
x
a
apa p x
a
a p
a p
p p
px
px
px
x
a
F g x G p
g x e dx
e e dx
e dx
e e dx
e e dx
e e
w
w
w
w
w
sw
w w
p ps
p ps
p ps
p ps
p ps
p pps ps
-
-
-
¥
-
-¥
¥
-
-¥
¥ -
-¥
¥
- +-
-¥
æ ö÷ç + ÷ç ÷ç¥ è ø-
-¥
--
=
=
=
=
=
=
= =
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
i
i
i
i
i
2
22
2
22
2
2
1 1
2
.
F
p
F
F
e
s
s
p
s
p
-
=                             (33) 
The ( )G p  Fourier transform of the Gaussian signal ( )g x  is also Gaussian in the conjugate-
variable space, with variance 
2
0
2 1
F
ws
s = . In other words, the ( )iF j  Fourier transform of the 
Gaussian coherent state ij  is also a Gaussian state. Since the position and momentum quadra-
tures are Fourier-transform pairs, it follows that as the modulation variance 2ws  of the input 
Gaussian signal increases, the variance 2Fs  of the Fourier transformed signal decreases. From the 
uncertainty principle, it can be concluded that if 
0
x wsD =  (i.e., the uncertainty of the Gaussian 
is proportional to the standard deviation) and 
0
1p
ws
D = , then 1x pD D = .  
   ■ 
 
The normalized Gaussian functions ( )
2
22
2
1
2 2
x
i
ii
g x e
sw
wwps s
-
=  and ( )
2
22
2
2
2
p
Fi i
i
G p e
sw
w
s
ps
-
=  are shown 
in Fig. 1. In terms of the quadratures, the momentum p  is the Fourier transform of the position 
x , and the position x  is the inverse-Fourier transform of the momentum p .  
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Figure 1. The input Gaussian state in the position basis (a) and the CVQFT transformed signal 
in the momentum basis, where 2 21
i iF ws s=  (b).  
 
The characterization of the Gaussian sub-channels is proposed Theorem 1. 
 
Theorem 1. The AMQD divides the Gaussian channel  into n Gaussian sub-channels 
,i 1, ,i n=  , with independent noise variances 2
i
s , where 2 21 1 i
n
in
s s= =å  . 
 
Proof.  
Let n is the number of Alice’s input Gaussian states. The n input coherent states are modeled by 
an n-dimensional, zero-mean, circular symmetric complex random Gaussian vector  
( ) ( )1, , 0,Tnz z= + = Î zz x p K i ,                            (34) 
where each iz  can be modeled as a zero-mean, circular symmetric complex Gaussian random 
variable ( )20,
zi
iz wsÎ  , i i iz x p= + i .  
The real and imaginary variables (i.e., the position and momentum quadratures) formulate n-
dimensional real Gaussian random vectors, ( )1, , Tnx x=x   and ( )1, , Tnp p=p  , with zero-
mean Gaussian random variables  
2
22
0
0
1
2
xi
ix e
sw
ws p
-
= , 
2
22
0
0
1
2
pi
ip e
sw
ws p
-
= ,                                (35) 
where 
0
2
ws  is the stands for single-carrier modulation variance (precisely, the variance of the real 
and imaginary components of iz ), while zK  is the n n´  Hermitian covariance matrix of z : 
†é ùê úë û=zK zz ,                                               (36) 
where †z  is the adjoint of z . For vector z ,  
 11
e eg gé ùé ù é ù= =ê úë û ë ûë ûz z zi i                                        (37) 
holds, and 
( )TT Te e eg g gé ùé ù é ù= =ê úê ú ê úë û ë ûê úë ûzz z z zzi i i2   ,                             (38) 
for any 0,2g pé ùÎ ë û . The density of z  is as follows (if zK  is invertible): 
( ) † 11
detn
f ep
--= z
z
z K z
K
z .                                      (39) 
A n-dimensional Gaussian random vector is expressed as =x As , where A  is an (invertible) 
linear transform from n  to n , and s  is an n-dimensional standard Gaussian random vector 
( )0,1
n
 . This vector is characterized by its covariance matrix ( ) T Té ù =ê úë û= Ax xx AC , as 
( ) ( )
( )21
2 det
.
T
T
n T
e
p
-
=
x x
AA
AA
x                                     (40) 
The Fourier transformation ( )F ⋅  of the n-dimensional Gaussian random vector ( )1, , Tnv v=v   
results in the n-dimensional Gaussian random vector ( )1, , Tnm m=m  : 
( )
( )2 2 21
0
2 2
m mnT T
F e e
sw- + +-= = =m AA mm v

.                               (41) 
In the first step of AMQD, Alice applies the inverse FFT operation to vector z  (see (34)), which 
results in an n-dimensional zero-mean, circular symmetric complex Gaussian random vector d , 
( )0,Î dd K , ( )1, , Tnd d=d  , precisely as 
( )
( )2 2 21
0
2 21
d dnT T
F e e
sw + +-= = =d AA dd z

,                               (42) 
where 
i ii d d
d x p= + i , ( )20,
i
i d
d sÎ  , and the position and momentum quadratures of if  are 
i.i.d. Gaussian random variables 
( )20,
id F
x sÎ  , ( )20,
id F
p sÎ  ,                                    (43) 
where †é ùê úë û=dK dd , e eg gé ùé ù é ù= =ê úë û ë ûë ûd d di i   , and ( )TT Te e eg g gé ùé ù é ù= =ê úê ú ê úë û ë ûê úë ûdd d d ddi i i2    
for any 0,2g pé ùÎ ë û .  
In the next step, Alice modulates the coherent Gaussian subcarriers as follows: 
( )1i id F zf -= = .                                       (44) 
The result of (42) defines n, independent i  Gaussian sub-channels, each with noise variance 
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2
i
s , one for each subcarrier coherent state if . After the CV subcarriers are transmitted 
through the noisy channel, Bob applies the CVQFT, which results him the noisy version 
i izj ¢ ¢=  of Alice’s input iz . 
On Bob’s side, the received system y  is an n-dimensional zero-mean, circular symmetric complex 
Gaussian random vector ( )†0, é ùêë ûÎ úy yy  . The m-th element of vector y  is my , expressed as 
follows: 
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
1  
,
m m
m
i i i in
y F z F
F F F z F
F T F d F
-
= + D
= + D
= + Då
T
T



                            (45) 
where  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 , , T nn nT Té ù= Îë ûT     ,                            (46) 
where 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )Re Imi i i i i iT T T= + Î   i ,                         (47) 
is a complex variable, which quantifies the position and momentum quadrature transmission (i.e., 
gain) of the i-th Gaussian sub-channel i , in the phase space  , with real and imaginary parts 
( )0 Re 1 2 ,i iT£ £  ( )0 Im 1 2i iT£ £ . The ( )i iT   variable has a magnitude of 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2Re Imi i i i i iT T T= + Î    , where ( ) ( )Re Imi i i iT T=  , by our conven-
tion.   
The CVQFT-transformed channel transmission parameters are (upscaled by n ) expressed by 
the complex vector: 
( )( ) ( )( ) 2
1 1 1
ik
n
n n n
n
i i k
i i k
F F T T e
p-
= = =
= = Îå ååT   i ,                      (48) 
where ( )( )F T   is the Fourier transform of (46). The n-dimensional ( )F D  complex vector is 
evaluated as 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )2 22 21
1
2 2
F F nTF F F n
F e e
s s
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷ç- D + + D ÷ç ÷ç ÷÷ç- D D D è ø
D = =

 C
,                       (49) 
which is the Fourier transform of the n-dimensional zero-mean, circular symmetric complex Gaus-
sian noise vector ( )20,
n
sDD Î  ,  
( ) ( )( )1, , 0,TnD = D D Î D  C ,                                (50) 
where ( ) †éD ùê úë= D ûDC  , with independent, zero-mean Gaussian random components 
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( )20,
i i
x sD Î   , ( )20,i ip sD Î    with variance 2 is , for each iD , which identifies the Gaus-
sian noise of the i-th sub-channel i  on the quadrature components in the phase space  .  
The CVQFT-transformed noise vector in (49) can be rewritten as 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 , , TnF F FD = D D ,                                   (51) 
with independent components ( ) ( )( )20,i ix FF sD Î    and ( ) ( )( )20,i ip FF sD Î    on the quad-
ratures, for each ( )iF D . It also defines an n-dimensional zero-mean, circular symmetric complex 
Gaussian random vector ( ) ( )( )( )0,F FD Î D C  with a covariance matrix 
( )( ) ( ) ( )†F F FD = D Dé ùê úë ûC  ,                                   (52)                    
and the noise variance ( )
2
F
s   of the independent Fourier-transformed quadratures is evaluated as 
 ( ) ( )
( ) 2
2 21
1
2 1 ,
i
n
n nF Fn
i
F s
s s
s
´
=
=
= =
åI

 

                                        (53) 
where 2s  is the noise variance of the Gaussian quantum channel  , n n´I  is the n n´  identity 
matrix, hence ( ) ( )( )20, ii FF s DD Î  , and ( ) ( ) 22 i iF Fs D é ù= Dê úë û , with independent noise vari-
ance ( )
2
F
s   on the quadrature components (For simplicity, the notation of n n´I  will be omitted 
from the description.). The LHS of (52) is justified by Proposition 1 and (33). It is an important 
corollary regarding the noise variance of the Fourier-transformed vector (51). 
An AMQD block is formulated from n Gaussian subcarrier continuous variables, as follows:  
( )( ) ( ) ( )j F F j F jé ù é ù é ù= + Dë û ë û ë ûy T d , 1, ,j n=  ,                     (54) 
where j is the index of the AMQD block, ( )( )F T   is defined in (48), ( ) ( )( )1F F F-=d z , 
where ( )1F- z  is shown in (42), while 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
1
1
, , ,
, , ,
, , .
T
n
T
n
T
n
j y j y j
F j F d j F d j
F j F j F j
é ù é ù é ù=ë û ë û ë û
é ù é ù é ù=ë û ë û ë û
é ù é ù é ùD = D Dë û ë û ë û
y
d



                          (55)        
The squared magnitude  
( ) 2F jt é ù= ë ûd                                               (56) 
identifies an exponentially distributed variable, with density ( ) ( ) 2221 2 ,nf e wt swt s -=  and from 
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the Parseval theorem [6] it follows that  
22n wt sé ù £ë û ,                                            (57)  
while the average quadrature modulation variance is 
0
2 2 21
1
,
i
n
n
i
w w ws s s=
= =å                                         (58) 
where 2
iws  is the modulation variance of the quadratures of the subcarrier if  transmitted by 
sub-channel i .  
The transformed vector y  in (45) and (55) clearly demonstrates that the physical Gaussian 
channel is, in fact, divided into n Gaussian quantum channels with independent noise variances. 
Each i  Gaussian sub-channel is dedicated for the transmission of one Gaussian subcarrier CV 
from the n subcarrier CVs. 
   ■ 
 
3.2  Gaussian Noise of the Sub-channels 
Eve’s optimal entangling cloner attack [2] in the multicarrier modulation setting is described as 
follows. Let the quadratures of the i-th subcarrier if  transmitted by i  be 
( ), ,,in i in ix p , ( )2, 0,
i
in ix wsÎ  , ( )2, 0, iin ip wsÎ  ,                          (59) 
where 2
iws  is the modulation variance of the CVQFT transformed subcarrier CVs. Eve, equipped 
with n EPR ancilla pairs nEB
ÄY  each with variance iW , and prepares her iE  as follows: 
( ), ,,E i E ix p ,  ( )2 2, 0,
i i
E ix ws sÎ +  , ( )2 2, 0, i iE ip ws sÎ +  ,              (60) 
The part iB  of is sent back to i , which system has the following quadratures: 
( ), ,,B i B ix p ,  ( )2 2, 0,
i i
B ix ws sÎ +  , ( )2 2, 0, i iB ip ws sÎ +  .              (61) 
The simplified view of Eve’s Gaussian attack in the multicarrier scenario is summarized in Fig. 2. 
Eve attacks each sub-channel with a BS with transmittance ,Eve iT Î  , 2,0 1Eve iT< < , and an 
entangled ancilla EBY  with variance W. The quadratures of the i-th sub-channel are 
( ), ,,in i in ix p , Eve’s quadratures are ( ), ,,E i E ix p , Bob’s received noisy quadratures are ( ), ,,in i in ix p¢ ¢ . 
Each sub-channel is characterized with a Gaussian noise ( )20,
i
s   on the quadrature compo-
nents, with independent noise variance 2
i
s . As shown in (50), Eve’s optimal Gaussian attacks 
define an n-dimensional zero-mean, circular symmetric complex Gaussian random noise vector. 
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1F- U
1
n
EB
ÄY
,1EveT
iW
Alice Bob
Eve
BS 1
( ), ,,E i E ix p
n
BS n
( ),
n nB B
x p
( )
1 1
,B Bx p

,Eve nT
( ),1 ,1,in inx p
( ), ,,in n in nx p
 
Figure 2. The entangler cloning attack in the multicarrier modulation scheme. The unitary re-
fers to the CVQFT  operation. 
 
In the AMQD scenario, the appropriate noise vector is given by (49) and (52), as 
( ) ( )( )( )0,F FD Î D C , and ( ) ( )( )20, ii FF s DD Î  , respectively. For the security proof of 
AMQD against optimal Gaussian collective attacks is being presented in Theorem 4. 
 
3.3   Crosstalk Noise on the Sub-channels 
The crosstalk is an additive noise in multicarrier transmission that can occur between adjacent 
sub-channels. Crosstalk noise can result from a nonperfect sub-channel separation and sub-
channel filtering procedure. As a result of interchannel crosstalk, some information from neighbor-
ing channels can leak, which acts as noise to the receiver. In practice, crosstalk arises from the 
imperfections of optical filters, optical switches or other optical components, e.g., from the imper-
fect isolation of different wavelength ports [19].  
The effect of interchannel crosstalk in an AMQD modulation is depicted in Fig. 3.  Crosstalk 
noise has no effect on the security of AMQD modulation, since it allows no more leaking of in-
formation to an eavesdropper than single-carrier CVQKD protocols (see Theorem 4).  
 
 
Figure 3. The effect of crosstalk noise between sub-channels. Due to the imperfections of practi-
cal devices, some information from neighboring sub-channels can be leaked to a given sub-
channel, which acts as noise to the receiver.  
 16
As it is depicted in Fig. 3, for sub-channel 2, some crosstalk information brings up from neighbor-
ing sub-channels, 1 and 3. Any nonzero crosstalk information can leak information of only negli-
gible valuable to Eve, as is proven in Theorem 4. 
 
The crosstalk information ( )ig   on the i-th sub-channel i , 1 ,i n=   is evaluated as follows: 
( ) ( ):i j j jj i x A Bg c¹= å ,                                     (62) 
where 0 1jx£ £ , ( ) ( ) ( ):j j j j jA B H B H B Ac = -  is the Holevo information of Alice and 
Bob conveyed by the neighboring sub-channel ,j  for all j i¹ . The average crosstalk on the n 
sub-channels is expressed as  
 ( ) ( )1 :j j jn j in x A Bg c¹= å å  .                                (63) 
Since the crosstalk noise ( )i ig   on sub-channel i  acts for Bob as Gaussian noise (which is 
justified by the Central Limit Theorem, more precisely for i  ¥ ), it can be modeled by 
( )20,
i
i gg sÎ   with variance 
22
i
igs gé ù= ê úë û . This additional noise does not change the rate 
formulas of AMQD (see (74) and (80)), because this additional noise is already contained in the 
sub-channel’s noise variance 2
i
s .  
In other words, the mutual information between Alice and Bob is completely characterized for a 
given i  by the noise variance 2
i
s , which can be decomposed as 
,
2 2 2
i i
Eve i gs s s+= ,                                          (64) 
where 2 ,Eve is  is the noise variance of Eve’s optimal Gaussian collective attack. 
Assuming that l sub-channels have been allocated for the multicarrier transmission, the mutual 
information function of Alice and Bob remains untouched under the presence of nonzero 
crosstalk, i.e., ( ) ( )1: :j jllI A B I A B= å .  
However, the ( ):B Ec  Holevo information of Eve changes as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
,
2
,
: :
: : ,
i
Eve i in
Eve i j j jn j i
B E B E T
B E T x A B
gc c g
c c¹
= +
= +
å
å å

                    (65) 
where 2,Eve iT  is the squared magnitude of Eve’s ,Eve iT  normalized complex transmittance 
, , ,Re ImEve i Eve i Eve iT T T= + Î i , where ,0 Re 1 2Eve iT£ £ , ,0 Im 1 2Eve iT£ £  that 
characterizes the attack of sub-channel i , and the quantity ( )ig   is calculated with respect 
to the n sub-channel (a nonzero crosstalk can also occur on an unused sub-channel, hence all sub-
channels have to be taken into consideration in the RHS of (65)).  
For detailed security proof of AMQD against optimal Gaussian collective attacks, see Theorem 4.  
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3.4 Run of Multicarrier Quadrature Division 
The run of the multicarrier quadrature division is sketched as follows. In the initial phase, Alice 
draws an n-dimensional, zero-mean circular symmetric complex Gaussian random vector 
( ) ( )1, , 0,Tnz z= + = Î zz x p K i , i i iz p q= + i , and ( )
0
20,ix wsÎ  , ( )020,ip wsÎ   are 
i.i.d. Gaussian random variables that identifies the x position and p momentum quadratures in 
the phase space  , while 
0
2
ws  is the modulation variance (at a single-carrier transmission).  
In the next step, Alice applies the inverse FFT on z , that gives her the results of an n-
dimensional, zero-mean circular symmetric complex Gaussian random vector 
( ) ( )1, , 0,Tnd d= + = Î dd x p K i . According to d , she prepares the 1 nf   Gaussian sub-
carrier CVs, by modulating with 
0
2 2
w ws s¹  the position and momentum quadratures, where if  
is the i-th subcarrier continuous variable. The n subcarrier coherent states if  divide the physi-
cal Gaussian quantum channel into n physical Gaussian quantum channels, each equipped with 
an independent noise variance 2
i
s .  
In the decoding phase, Bob applies the CVQFT unitary operation U  on the received noisy Gaus-
sian subcarrier CVs, if¢ , which results him the noisy coherent state versions of Alice’s Gaussian 
variables, 1 1n nzj¢ ¢ ¢= = z  , and the Fourier transformed sub-channel noise variance 
( )
2
iF
s  . The CVQFT-transformed ( )( ) 2i iF T   transmission parameters of the Gaussian sub-
channels are strongly diverse (this will be shown in Section 4), which makes available the use of 
an adaptive variance modulation to improve the tolerable noise and excess noise. 
The steps of multicarrier quadrature division modulation are summarized in Fig. 4.  
Gaussian
modulation
1d
nd
  
1f¢1f
nf (AWGN)
1, , nz z
nf¢

1j¢
nj¢
Modulated CV 
subcarriers
Circ. sym. complex 
random Gaussian 
variables
( )CVQFT( )IFFT
1F- U
 
Figure 4. The AMQD modulation scheme. Alice draws an n-dimensional, zero-mean, circular 
symmetric complex Gaussian random vector z , which are then inverse Fourier-transformed by 
1F- . The resulting vector d  encodes the subcarrier quadratures for the Gaussian modulation. In 
the decoding, Bob applies the U unitary CVQFT on the n subcarriers to recover the noisy version 
of Alice’s original variable as a continuous variable in the phase space. 
 
(Note: In the two-way protocol, Bob sends the subcarrier CVs to Alice, who generates coupled 
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Gaussian CVs with her BS. The resulting Gaussian subcarrier CV is then sent back to Bob, who 
applies the CVQFT operation. Alice also applies a CVQFT operation on her system.) The reason 
behind the improvement is that the dB limits of the transmission over the Gaussian quantum 
channel can significantly be extended by the Fourier-transformed multicarrier continuous vari-
ables. The adaptive modulation sends information through only the high-quality sub-channels, 
while the noisy sub-channels transmit no information, as it is proposed in the next section. 
 
4  Adaptive Modulation Variance 
Theorem 2. (Adaptive modulation variance.) The ratio ( )( ) 22i i iF Tn s=   , where 
( )( ) 2 22 1
ik
n
n
i i kk
F T T e
p-
== å i , 1i n=  , provides the ( )2 minEve iws n n= -  optimal con-
stant modulation variance for the Gaussian sub-channels, where Even  is a security bound of the 
optimal Gaussian collective attack.  
 
Proof. 
The proof consists of two parts. First, we show that there exists an optimal constant modulation 
variance for the sub-channels with average ( )2 21
i
Evennw ws s n n= = -å , where Even  is the secu-
rity bound of Eve’s optimal Gaussian collective attack, and n  is 
( )( )
2 2
1
2 22
1
1 1
1 1
n
i i
nik
n n i iin
ki k
inn n F T
T e
p
s sn n =
-
=
= =
å= = = åå å
å   i .                       (66) 
Then, we show that for low SNRs, the optimal solution is ( )min in n= , which requires no the 
exact knowledge of the state of the sub-channels.  
The modulation variances of each of the i  sub-channels (zero or nonzero) are dependent on the 
value of Even . This parameter is defined as 
1
Eve ln = ,                                                  (67) 
where l  is the Lagrange multiplier as  
( ) 2 22* *1 1 1 iknn n ki knF T T e pl -= == = å å i ,                          (68) 
where *T  is the expected transmittance of the n sub-channels under an optimal Gaussian attack. 
From l , and the 2
iws  modulation variances of the i  sub-channels, a Lagrangian can be con-
structed as  
 ( ) ( )( ) 22 2
1
2 2 2
2
1 1
, log 1
i ii
n i
n nF T
i i
ws
w w wsl s s l s= =
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= + -÷ç ÷ç ÷è øå å 
 .                 (69) 
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By the Kuhn-Tucker condition [6], [9-10], follows that 
2
0
iw
s
¶
¶ =
  if only the i-th sub-channel gets a 
non-zero modulation variance, 2 0
iws > , while 2 0
iw
s
¶
¶ £
 , if the sub-channel gets zero modulation 
variance, 2 0
iws =  [6], [9-10].  
After some calculations, one gets the following average modulation variance: 
( )( ) ( )
2
2
2 1 1
1 1i i
n n
Eve Eve in nF Ti i
s
ws n n n
= =
æ ö÷ç= - = -÷ç ÷ç ÷è øå å ,                       (70) 
where n  is shown in (66). One can readily see that in (70), each sub-channel is allocated by a 
different modulation variance, depending on the actual value of ( )( ) 2i iF T  . The reason for 
this is as follows. Only those l n<  sub-channels can transmit information for which i Even n< ; 
otherwise, the channel gets zero modulation variance. (In general, this kind of strategy is called 
water-filling [6], [9-10].) Since it is not a reasonable assumption in a practical CVQKD that the 
transmitter would have an exact knowledge about the state of each Gaussian sub-channels, at this 
point we have to introduce a more flexible technique. Our answer is as follows.  
In fact, it is not a required condition to calculate with the exact in  parameters and modulation 
variances 2
iws  for the sub-channels. A simplified solution exists: give a constant modulation vari-
ance 2ws  for those l i  sub-channels, for which i Even n<  is satisfied: 
 ( )( ) ( )
2
2
2 1
max1
min
i i
i
l
Eve Eve il F Ti
s
ws n n n
=
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= - = -÷ç ÷ç ÷è øå   .                    (71) 
It is particular convenient, since at a given Even  bound, it is enough to find a given 
( )( ) 21 1max l li F T    for those i  sub-channels, for which i Even n<  hold (Note: It can be 
determined in a pre-calibration phase prior to the main run of the protocol. In practice, this 
phase can be established in one simple step by sending empty “pilot” continuous variables over 
the sub-channels that contain no valuable information.), and then allocating the same modulation 
variance 2ws  for all of these sub-channels.  
Particularly, the significance of the adaptive-variance modulation proposed in (71) is crucial for 
low SNRs, which is precisely the case in a long-distance scenario, since the information transmis-
sion capability of the Gaussian sub-channels become very sensitive in the low SNR regimes [4], 
[6], [9-10]. At low SNRs the constant allocation provides an optimal solution [9-10], because its 
performance is very close to the exact allocation and can be performed with no exact knowledge 
about the state of the sub-channels. This is very good news, because the proposed AMQD modu-
lation scheme allocates a constant modulation variance for the good Gaussian sub-channels.  
 
The algorithm of the optimal constant [9-10] modulation variance adaption is summarized as fol-
lows. 
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        Algorithm  
1. Let the squared magnitudes of the Fourier-transformed sub-channel 
transmittance coefficients given in an ordered list 
( )( ) 21 1l lL F T=    so that ( )( ) ( )( )2 21 1i i i iF T F T + +³   
and 1i in n +£ , and let l  be the Lagrange coefficient and 1Even l= . 
Let c  be the largest index in the list, denoted by ( )L c , for which 
( )( ) 2F Tc c l> . For ( )L i c> , ( )( ) 21 1n nF Tc c l+ + £  .  
2. Let 2ws  be the average modulation 
( )( ) 22
22
2
21
max log 1
i ii
ii
F T
i
w
w
sc
w ss
s =
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= + ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øå 

, where 2 0
iws ³ . Determine 
the constant modulation variance 2ws  as 2 21
i
w wccs s= å . 
3. If 21 1c wn s n+ ³ +  then ( ) ( )1L Lc c= - , and re-determine 2ws  as 
2 21
11 iw wccs s--= å . 
4. If 21 1c wn s n+ < + , then ( ) ( )1L Lc c= + , compute 
( )( ) 22
2
1
21
log 1 i i
F T
i
wsc
s
+
=
æ ö÷ç + ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øå 
 , where ( )( ) 2 22 1
ik
n
n
i i kk
F T T e
p-
== å i .  
The rate over the 1c +  Gaussian sub-channels is ( )( )
22
221
log 1 i i
F T
R w
s
c s+
æ ö÷ç= + ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øå 
 , which ap-
proximates the complex domain capacity by precisely 
( )( ) 22
2 2
log 1
1
2 ln 2
F Ti isw
s
c
æ ö÷ç ÷ç- + ÷ç ÷ç ÷çè ø
+å

  [9-10]. 
 
The modulation variance adaption scheme is summarized in Fig. 5. The parameter in  of the 
Gaussian sub-channels is depicted in yellow. If in  is under a critical limit Even , the channel is 
assumed to be useful and can be used for information transmission. If i Even n< , Alice allocates a 
constant modulation variance 2 2
i
wws s=  according to (71), for the Gaussian sub-channel i . If 
i Even n³ , Alice allocates zero modulation variance for i , i.e., 2 0
iws = .  
 
 21
 
Figure 5. The constant modulation variance allocation mechanism. If the i-th sub-channel i  is 
very noisy, i.e., i Even n³ , Alice will not use that sub-channel, i.e., the modulation variance 2
iws  
of if  is 0. Only those sub-channels will be used for the transmission for which in  is under the 
critical bound Even  (red dashed line). Assuming l  sub-channels with i Even n< , the modulation 
variance for these sub-channels is chosen to be a constant ( )2 1min , ,
i
Eve nws n n n= -  , where 
0
2 2 2
il
l nww ws s s= <å , and 02ws  is the single-carrier modulation variance. 
 
The AMQD is equipped with all of those properties that allow it to meet the requirements of an 
experimental protocol, since its real potential is brought to life at very low SNRs. As a fine corol-
lary, the transmission efficiency significantly can be boosted in an experimental long-distance 
CVQKD scenario. 
The adaptive modulation variance can be rephrased in terms of the normalized ( ) 21
n
T   
squared magnitude of the channel transmittance ( )T  , where n is the number of subcarrier 
CVs. Let ( )( ) 222 1nF Tn s=   , and ( )( ) ( )( )
2
221
22 1
max
n
Even
F T
T
s
ws n= - 

 . In this ap-
proach, the optimal modulation variance is 
( )( )
21
2 2 2
0
T
x dxw ws s=ò  ,                                      (72) 
where ( ) 21
n
x T=  , which precisely coincidences with (71). 
In Fig. 6, the adaptive modulation variance technique in terms of the normalized quantity [6] 
( ) 21
n
T   and parameter ( )( ) 222 1nF Tn s=    is shown. The maximal value of ( ) 2F T  
is obtained at ( ) 21 0
n
T  , because as n increases, the normalized quantity represents a  
finer sampling  of ( )T   of the physical quantum channel.  
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Figure 6. The constant modulation variance allocation in function of the normalized squared 
magnitude. As the number of subcarrier goes to infinity, the rate goes arbitrary close to the real 
capacity of the Gaussian quantum channel. Only those sub-channels get nonzero modulation vari-
ance 2ws  for which i Even n<  holds. 
 
For the l Gaussian sub-channels i , i Even n< , the mutual information is evaluated as follows. 
Assuming a single-carrier modulation over a Gaussian channel   with noise variance 2s , and 
modulation variance 
0
2
ws , let the ( )singleR   maximal rate between Alice and Bob is  
( ) ( )
22
0
22log 1 .
T
singleR
ws
s
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= + ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø
                                  (73) 
For the l Gaussian sub-channels ( )AMQDR   is evaluated as 
( ) ( )( )
22
22
1
max log 1
i ii
l F T
AMQD i i
R w
s
s" =
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= + ÷ç ÷ç ÷è øå 
 ,                          (74) 
where 2 2 21
1 i
l
l l il
s s s´ == = åI    follows from (52) for the noise variance of the l Gaussian sub-
channels. For the 2ws  averaged modulation variance of the l sub-channels, the relation  
0
2 2 21
1
i
l
l
i
w w ws s s=
= <å                                            (75) 
follows, see (58). The multicarrier modulation transmits the same amount of information, hence 
at (75), ( ) ( )( )
0
2 22 21
i
ill
T F Tw ws s= å   holds, i.e., 
( ) ( )AMQD singleR R=  .                                      (76) 
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Furthermore, (76) can be increased by improving the average modulation variance in (75) up to 
0
2 2
w ws s= . In this case, between (73) at 0
2
ws , and (74) at 0
2 2
w ws s= , the connection is 
( ) ( )( )
0
2 22 21
i
ill
T F Tw ws s< å  , hence: 
( ) ( )AMQD singleR R>  ,                                       (77) 
which shows that better rates can be reached by the AMQD modulation at a given noise variance 
2s  and modulation variance 
0
2
ws , in comparison to the single-carrier modulation. 
Let 0 1£ W £  be the probability that the ( )( ) 2i il F Tå   sum of the squared magnitude of 
the Fourier transformed channel transmission coefficients of the l Gaussian sub-channels pick up 
the maximum ( )( ) ( )( )2 2maxi i i il liF T F T"=å å  : 
( )( ) ( )( )( )2 2Pr maxi i i il liF T F T"W = =å å  .                    (78) 
From this, the achievable rate is  
( ) ( )( )
2
max
2log 1 SNR
i ili
F T
AMQDR W
æ öå ÷ç ÷ç= W + ⋅ ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø
 .                       (79) 
It can be concluded that the adaptive modulation variance increases the performance, especially 
in low SNR regimes, in which situation a constant modulation variance for all sub-channels is 
optimal. It also optimizes the received modulation variance at the decoder. 
Finally, in terms of (72) the rate is evaluated as 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
222 2 11
2
220
log 1 n
x F TT
AMQDR dx
ws
s
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷= +ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷÷çè ø
ò 
 ,                    (80) 
where ( ) 21
n
x T=   and n  ¥ .  
These results conclude the proof of Theorem 2. 
   ■ 
 
 
5  Efficiency of AMQD Modulation 
Theorem 3 (Efficiency of the AMQD modulation). At a given channel transmittance ( ) 2T  , 
more loss can be tolerated over the Gaussian sub-channels, which leads to higher tolerable excess 
noise at a given modulation variance 
0
2
ws .  
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Proof. 
The efficiency of the adaptive multicarrier division technique can be approached by how effi-
ciently the allocated modulation frequencies are utilized at a given secret key rate. Assuming a 
single-carrier quadrature encoding-scheme with efficiency 
2
0
bR
single
ws
h = ,                                                 (81) 
where 2b =  is the number of quadrature bases (position and momentum bases), R  is the secret 
key rate, and 
0
2
ws  is the modulation variance used for the modulation of n coherent states. In the 
adaptive multicarrier division technique, the rate R given in (81) can be reached with efficiency:  
2
bR
AMQD
ws
h = ,                                                  (82) 
where 2ws  is the constant modulation variance is used for the l subcarriers. If 
0
2 2
w ws s<  holds at a 
given R, the multicarrier modulation scheme transmits the same amount of information such as 
the single-carrier modulation scheme, with increased efficiency, AMQD singleh h> .  
The improvement in the tolerable loss is as follows. In the single-carrier modulation scheme, at 
the 3.1 dB of signal attenuation the quantum channel efficiency falls below 0.5. In the multicar-
rier modulation, the tolerable loss is more than 3.1 dB  at the same modulation variance 
0
2
ws  
(justified by the convention of full width at half maximum (FWHM)).  
For 
0
2
ws  and AMQD modulation, the -3.1 dB attenuation brings up at diverse amount of loss, 
which is equivalent to the use of an improved virtual modulation variance 
0
2
wsA , where 1A > . 
At 
0
2
ws , a higher modulation variance 0
2
wsA  can be virtually simulated by the multicarrier 
transmission, which result higher tolerable loss (dBs) and higher tolerable excess noise in overall. 
To demonstrate it, let the input Gaussian 
( )
2
22
0
0
1
1 2
x
g x e
sw
ws p
-
= .                                           (83) 
The 
0
2 2
w ws s<  modulation variance of the l sub-channels leads to a Gaussian 
( )
2
221
2 2
x
g x e sw
ws p
-
= .                                             (84) 
From (84) the virtual Gaussian signal at a modulation variance 
0
2
ws  is as follows 
( )
2
22
0
0
1
3 2
x
g x e
sw
ws p
-
A
A= ,                                         (85) 
where 
0 0
2 2
w ws sA > , and 1A > , which is evaluated as 
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( )( )
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
22
1
2 21 1 1 1
2 2 2
2 2
ik
l l l
ki kl
i i i il ll l
T e
F T F T
T T T
A
p-
= =å åå å= = = 
  
i
.                    (86) 
The FWHMs of these Gaussian signals are as follows: 
( )( )
01
FWHM 2 2 ln2g x ws= ,                                   (87) 
( )( )2FWHM 2 2 ln 2g x ws=                                      (88) 
and 
( )( )
03
FWHM 2 2 ln2g x ws= A .                                 (89) 
These results are summarized in Fig. 7. 
 
 
Figure 7. (a). The FWHM of the single-carrier Gaussian signal (blue) and the Gaussian signal of 
the subcarrier transmission (red). (b). The FWHM of the virtual Gaussian signal at a modulation 
variance of 
0
2
ws  is 02 2 ln 2 wsA , 1A > . The AMQD allows more tolerable loss at a given 
modulation variance 
0
2
ws .  
 
The improvement in the excess noise is as follows [3]. In the single-carrier case, at a given EveT  
and W, the excess noise is as follows [3]: 
( )( )2
2
1
1
Eve
Eve
W T
single
T
N
-
-
= ,                                            (90) 
where 2 2 0,1EveT T é ù< Î ë û  is the squared magnitude of the complex variable EveT . 
In the AMQD modulation, at a given W, the excess noise is reduced to 
( ) ( )( )
( )
21
,
21
,
1
1
Eve inn
Eve inn
W F T
AMQD
F T
N
-
-
å= å ,                                    (91) 
where  
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( ) 2, ,1 iknnEve i Eve kkF T T e p-== å i                                      (92) 
and 
( ) ( )2 22 2 2 21 1 1, ,1 iknnEve i Eve k Eve in n k nn n nF T T e T T F T
p-
== £ < £å å å åi ,    (93) 
which relation is justified by the CVQFT transformation. Since, at a given W, the tolerable ex-
cess noise depends only on EveT , from (93) it follows, that in the AMQD modulation scheme 
higher amount of excess noise N can be tolerated.  
The improvement in the tolerable excess noise can be approached by the ratio 1k ³  between the 
excess noise singleN  and AMQDN  as: 
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
2 21
,
2 21
,
22 2 1
,
2 221 1
, ,
22 2 1
,
22 1
,
1 1
1 1
.
single
AMQD
Eve Eve inn
Eve Eve inn
Eve Eve Eve inn
Eve i Eve Eve in nn n
Eve Eve Eve inn
Eve inn
N
N
W T F T
T W F T
T T F T
F T T F T
T T F T
T F T
k
- -
- -
-
-
-
=
å= å
å= å å
å= å
                                (94)                     
The tolN  tolerable excess noise in AMQD modulation with homodyne measurement [3] is de-
picted in Fig. 8. The improvement in the tolerable excess noise is , ,tol AMQD tol singleN Na= , where 
1single AMQDx x N Na k= = ³ , and 1AMQD singleN N x£ £ . 
 
Figure 8. Tolerable excess noise in function of channel transmittance in a single-carrier Gaussian 
modulation with homodyne measurement (a) and in AMQD modulation (b). Abbreviations: DR – 
Direct Reconciliation, RR – Reverse Reconciliation. 
 
The improvement in the amount of tolerable excess noise is more significant in two-way CVQKD, 
since the multicarrier transmission is present in both directions between Alice to Bob.  
  ■ 
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The improvements of the AMQD modulation lead to different secret key rates, as it is summa-
rized in Section 5.1. 
 
5.1  Secret Key Rates in an AMQD Modulation  
The secret key rates of AMQD modulation are evaluated as follows. Let n subcarriers, and l  
Gaussian sub-channels with i Even n< , and let the variance of Eve’s EPR-ancilla W [2-3].  
The CVQKD secret key rates with AMQD modulation follows from the rates already obtained in 
[3], and sketched as follows (The rates are measured in the real dimension which is the reason 
behind the normalization of 1 2 .). The detailed proof of the following rate formulas can be found 
in [3]; thus, for simplicity, we omit these steps here. 
 
5.1.1  AMQD Modulation in One-way CVQKD 
5.1.1.1  Homodyne measurement, Reverse Reconciliation 
( )( )( )
( )( )( )( )
( )
21
21
,hom 1
22 1
1 1 1 1
2 22 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
2 22 2 2 2
log
log log
log log ,
i ill
i ill
F T e
RR
one way
F T b
Wb e Wb e Wb e Wb e
W W W W
R - -
+ + - -
+ + - -
å= å
æ ö÷ç- - ÷ç ÷çè ø
- -


                        (95) 
where 
( )( )( )( ) ( )( )2 21 11 i i i il ll lb F T W F T= - +å å  ,                   (96) 
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )2 21 11 i i i il ll le F T F T W= - +å å  .                    (97) 
5.1.1.2  Homodyne measurement, Direct Reconciliation 
( )( )( ) ( )21 1 1,hom 1 1 12 2 22 2 2 2 21log log logi ill
W WDR W W W
one way
F T b
R + + - -- -
= - -å 
.                (98) 
 
5.1.2  AMQD Modulation in Two-way CVQKD 
5.1.2.1  Homodyne measurement, Reverse Reconciliation 
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )
22 21 1
221
1
1 1,hom 1 1 1
2 2 22 2 2 2 2
1
log log log .
i i i il ll l
i ill
F T F T
W WRR W W
two way
F T
R
æ ö÷ç ÷ç - + ÷ç ÷÷çè ø + + - -
-
-
å å
= - -
å
 

   (99) 
5.1.2.2  Homodyne measurement, Direct Reconciliation 
( )( )
( )( )( ) ( )
21
221
1 1,hom 1 1 1
2 2 22 2 2 2 2
1
log log log .i ill
i ill
F T W WDR W W
two way
F T
R + + - --
-
å= - -
å


            (100) 
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6 Security of AMQD for Gaussian Collective Attacks 
The main result regarding the security of AMQD is summarized in Theorem 4. It states that un-
der an optimal Gaussian collective attack, any crosstalk among the sub-channels cannot allow 
leaking of more information to an eavesdropper than the single-carrier CVQKD. 
 
Theorem 4 (Unconditional security of AMQD in presence of crosstalk, optimal Gaussian attack). 
Let ( ) 0g >   be a nonzero crosstalk among the sub-channels in an AMQD setting, and 
( ): singleB Ec  be Eve’s Holevo information under an optimal Gaussian collective attack for a 
single-carrier CVQKD. Then, ( ) ( ): :
single
B E B Egc c£ , where ( ):B E gc   is the Holevo in-
formation of Eve in AMQD modulation in the presence of nonzero crosstalk, under an optimal 
Gaussian collective attack. 
 
Proof.  
The proof will assume reverse reconciliation, hence Eve’s correlation will be quantified by the 
preserved correlation with Bob’s system (B). 
First, we express the eavesdropper information under an optimal Gaussian attack in an AMQD 
modulation. Then, we show that this attack – besides the fact that it maximizes Eve’s Holevo 
information – cannot leak more information to an eavesdropper than the single-carrier case. (The 
optimality of Gaussian collective attacks for single-carrier CVQKD has already been proven in 
[20], [21] and the proof follows for the multicarrier case of AMQD. Therefore, we focus mainly on 
the analysis of the amount of leakable information in a multicarrier CVQKD scenario, assuming 
an optimal Gaussian collective attack.) 
The notations used in our proof are summarized as follows. Let r Î   be the density matrix of a 
Gaussian state, and let r¢ Î   be the density matrix of a non-Gaussian state with the same co-
variance matrix and displacement vector. Let ( )p x  refer to the Gaussian probability distribu-
tion, and ( )p x¢  to an arbitrary probability distribution with the same first and second momenta 
as ( )p x . Let ABr  be a Gaussian state between Alice and Bob, and let ABr¢  refer to an arbitrary 
shared state. For these density matrices, the relation between the joint entropy is 
( ) ( )AB ABH Hr r¢³ .  
Let’s assume that a Gaussian density matrix ir  is transmitted through sub-channel i , and the 
shared state between Alice, Bob and Eve that is related to the i-th sub-channel is a pure system 
ABE
ir . The measurement process is characterized as follows. Let iX  be Alice’s classical variable 
that is encoded into the input system iA , which is a density matrix ir , and let iB  be the classi-
cal variable of Bob that results from a measurement { }, i
i
i i B B
M M=  applied on ir , where , ii BM  
are positive operators, †, ,i ii B i Bi M M I=å . The conditional entropy between iA  and iB  is 
( ) ( ) ( )i i i iH A B H A H B= - , where iA  refers to the measured density matrix ir  [20]. Let’s 
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denote Eve’s optimal Gaussian attack on the i-th sub-channel i  by the CPTP map i . Taking 
arbitrary density matrices r  and s , the relation ( ) ( ) ( )( )i ir s r s³     follows, where 
( )⋅ ⋅  is the relative entropy function, along with the entropic relation 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )H A H A H A H A¢ ¢- ³ -   [20].  
In the next step, we express the Holevo information of the eavesdropper ( ) ,: ii iB E gc   on a sub-
channel i , assuming reverse reconciliation, and optimal Gaussian attack, where iB  is Bob’s 
variable from the i-th sub-channel, while iE  identifies Eve’s variable. During the optimal Gaus-
sian attack against AMQD, Eve attacks each sub-channel separately with a beam splitter that 
has transmittance ,Eve iT .  
Assuming an average modulation variance 
0
2 2 21
illw w ws s s= <å  in the AMQD setting with l  
sub-channels for the transmittance ( 2
iws -s are constant values due to the optimality consumption, 
see Theorem 2), the following relation holds for the Holevo information of the eavesdropper: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
:
: .
i i ill
single single
B E H E H E B
H E H E B
B E H E H E B
c
c
= -
= -
£ = -
å

                  (101) 
This relation follows from that in an AMQD modulation ( ) ( )
single
H E X H E X³ , because the 
same amount of information is transmitted via modulation variance 
0
2 2
w ws s<  over the l sub-
channels.  
At this point, we add the 0g >  crosstalk into the picture. Assuming the use of sub-channel i , 
the optimal Gaussian attack leads to 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
,,
2
,
: :
: : .
i i
i
Eve i i
Eve i j j jj i
B E B E T
B E T x A B
gc c g
c c¹
= +
= +å
 


                    (102) 
The average modulation w  on the l sub-channels leads to average Holevo information  
( ) ( )1: : ,
i
ll
B E B Ec c= å                                       (103) 
while the average amount of crosstalk over all the n sub-channels is evaluated as 
 
( ) ( )
( )
1
1 : ,
inn
j j jn j in
x A B
g g
c¹
=
=
å
å å
  
                                (104) 
which together leads to the average Holevo information ( ):B E gc  over all the (n) sub-channels, 
as 
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( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
21 1
,
21 1
,
21 1
21 1
2
: :
: :
: :
:
: ,
i
i
i
i
Eve i il nl n
Eve i j j jl n j il n
Eve j j jl j il n
Eve il nl n
Eve
B E B E T
B E T x A B
B E T x A B
B E T
B E T
gc c g
c c
c c
c g
c g
¹
¹
= +
= +
= +
= +
= +
å å
å å å
å å
å å

 







           (105) 
where 22 1 ,Eve Eve innT T= å .  
For this quantity, the relation  
( ) ( ): :
single
B E B Egc c£                                     (106) 
follows, since for ( ) 0g >   
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
:
:
: ,
single single
B E H E H E B
B E H E H E B
B E H E H E B
g g
c
c
c
= -
< = -
£ = -
 

                   (107) 
and 
( ) ( ) ( )
single
H E B H E B H E Bg> ³ .                         (108) 
The relation ( ) ( )H E B H E B g>   holds for any ( ) 0g >  . The RHS of (108) is verified by 
the fact that a nonzero crosstalk has no relevance on the mutual information of Alice and Bob, 
i.e., communicating at a constant modulation variance 
0
2 2
w ws s<  on the l sub-channels, the rela-
tion ( ) ( ) ( )
single
H B A H B A H B Ag= =  follows for an AMQD modulation. The first equality 
follows from the fact that the presence of any nonzero crosstalk does not change on the mutual 
information of the legally parties, while the second comes from that the in an AMQD modulation 
the same amount information transmitted than single-carrier CVQKD via lower modulation vari-
ance (see (75)), from which (108) is immediately concluded. 
Finally, we show that the Gaussian collective attack is optimal in the AMQD modulation. Fixing 
the first and second moments, under an optimal Gaussian attack for all sub-channels i , 
1i n=  , and with a nonzero crosstalk ( ) 0g >  , by the optimality consumption one obtains 
nonnegative 0D ³  for the difference of Eve’s Holevo information that results from an optimal 
Gaussian and an arbitrary attack: 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )( ( ) ( )( ))
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1
2 21
, ,
2 2
2 2
: :
  : :
  
  
i i i i i il ll
Eve i j j j Eve i j j jn j i j in
Eve Eve
Eve Eve
B E B E
H E H E H E B H E B
T x A B T x A B
H E H E H E B H E B
T T
H AB H A B H AB X H A B X
T T
H AB H A B H AB H A B H X
g gc c
c c
g g
g g
¹ ¹
¢ ¢D = -
¢ ¢ ¢= - - -
¢+ -
¢ ¢ ¢= - - -
¢+ -
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢= - - -
¢+ -
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢= - - - +
å å
å å å
  
 
 
 
 
( )( )
( ) ( )( )2 2  ,Eve Eve
H X
T Tg g
¢-
¢+ -  
  (109) 
where ( ):B E gc ¢ ¢   is Eve’s average Holevo information in an AMQD modulation for an arbitrary 
attack, ( ):B E gc   is evaluated by (105), while ( )2EveT g   and ( )2EveT g ¢   refer to the 
leaked valuable crosstalk information under an optimal Gaussian and an arbitrary attack, respec-
tively.  
Since any nonzero crosstalk ( ) 0g >   acts as a Gaussian noise for the receiver that is already 
included in the sub-channel noise variance 2
i
s , see (64), the next equation is straightforward for 
the minimized mutual information under an optimal Gaussian collective attack:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )(
( ) ( )( ))
( ) ( )( )( ( ) ( )( ))
1
1
1
: : : :
    
0.
j j j jl ll
j j j jl ll
j j j jl
j j j j j jl ll
I A B I A B I A B I A B
H A H A H B H B
H A B H A B
H B H B H A B H A B
¢ ¢ ¢ ¢- = -
¢ ¢= - + -
¢ ¢- -
¢ ¢ ¢= - - -
£
å å
å å
å
å å
 (110) 
Thus, Eve’s Gaussian collective attack remains optimal in an AMQD modulation (i.e., Eve’s 
Holevo information is maximized), and the presence of a nonzero crosstalk has no effect on the 
mutual information between Alice and Bob.  
On the other hand, Eve’s Holevo information could be slightly improved by a nonzero crosstalk, 
to be precise by ( )2EveT g  , however an AMQD modulation does not allow leaking of more 
information to Eve than the single-carrier CVQKD. The argumentation behind this is as follows.  
The inequality  
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )2
: : 0
: : 0
single
Evesingle
B E B E
B E B E T
gc c
c c g
- ³
- + ³

                          (111) 
directly comes from (105), which combined with (108) leads to 
( ) ( ) ( )2: : EvesingleB E B E Tc c g- ³   ,                        (112) 
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which reveals that in an AMQD modulation, the degradation of Eve’s Holevo information in com-
parison to the single-carrier CVQKD is always equal to or greater than the valuable information 
that is leaked from the crosstalk to Eve, thus 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2: : : EvesingleB E B E B E Tgc c c g< < -    ,                (113) 
hence for any ( )2EveT g  , the inequality 
( ) ( ): : singleB E B Egc c£                                    (114) 
immediately follows.  
These results lead to the following key rates for reverse reconciliation at an AMQD modulation, 
under an optimal Gaussian collective attack:  
( ) ( ): :R I A B B E gc= -  ,                                     (115) 
and, if Bob is allowed to perform a collective measurement, then the rate is 
( ) ( ): :R A B B E gc c= -  .                                     (116) 
These results prove the unconditional security of AMQD against optimal Gaussian collective at-
tacks, which concludes the proof. 
 ■ 
 
7  Conclusions 
The CVQKD protocols represent one of the most capable practical manifestations of quantum 
information theory. While the DVQKD protocols cannot be implemented within the framework of 
current technology, the CVQKD schemes can be established over standard communication net-
works and practical devices. Besides the attractive properties, the CVQKD schemes have an ex-
treme sensitivity to the channel noise and other loss which allow no to use these protocols with 
such a high efficiency as it is available for traditional protocols in a traditional telecommunication 
scenario. To resolve the problem of low tolerable loss and excess noise, we introduced a new 
modulation scheme for CVQKD. The input Gaussian variables are transformed into several Gaus-
sian subcarrier CVs, which are then transformed back by the continuous unitary CVQFT opera-
tion at the receiver. The transmission is realized through several Gaussian sub-channels, each 
dedicated to a given subcarrier with an independent noise variance. The AMQD modulation al-
lows higher tolerable loss and excess noise in comparison with the standard modulation, and can 
be applied in both one-way and two-way CVQKD. We also investigated an adaptive modulation 
variance allocation mechanism for the scheme, which can significantly improve the efficiency of 
the transmission, particularly in the low SNR regimes. 
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Supplemental Information 
 
S.1  Notations 
The notations of the manuscript are summarized in Table S.1. 
 
Table S.1. The summary of the notations.  
 
Notation Description 
( ) ( )CVQFTF ⋅ = ⋅  The CVQFT transformation, applied on Bob’s 
side, continuous variable U unitary operation. 
( ) ( )1 IFFTF- ⋅ = ⋅  Inverse FFT transform, applied on Alice’s side. 
0
2
ws  Single-carrier modulation variance. 
2 21
illw ws s= å  
Multicarrier modulation variance. Average modu-
lation variance of the l Gaussian sub-channels 
i .  
( ) ( )1, , 0,Tnz z= + = Î zz x p K i  
An n-dimensional, zero-mean, circular symmetric 
complex random Gaussian vector, †é ùê úë û=zK zz , 
where i i iz x p= + i , ( )1, , Tnx x=x   and 
( )1, , Tnp p=p  , and ( )
0
20,ix wsÎ  , 
( )
0
20,ip wsÎ   are i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian 
random variables. 
( ) ( )1 0,F-= Î dd z K  
An n-dimensional, zero-mean, circular symmetric 
complex random Gaussian vector, †é ùê úë û=dK dd , 
( )1, , Tnd d=d  , i i id x p= + i ,  
( )20,
F
ix wsÎ  , ( )20, Fip wsÎ   are i.i.d. zero-
mean Gaussian random variables, 
0
2 21
Fw ws s= . 
The i-th component is ( )20,
i
i d
d sÎ  , with 
variance 22
i
id
ds é ù= ê úë û . 
( )1i i iF z df -= =  The i-th subcarrier Gaussian CV, where 1F-  stands for the inverse FFT.  
( ) ( )( )1i i i iF F F z zj f -= = =  Bob’s decoded Gaussian state, the CVQFT-
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transformed if  subcarrier CV.  
  Gaussian quantum channel in the single-carrier transmission. 
, 1, ,i i n=   Gaussian sub-channels in the multicarrier trans-mission. 
( ) ( ) ( )Re ImT T T= + Î   i  
Channel transmittance, normalized complex vari-
able. The real part identifies the position quadra-
ture transmission, the imaginary part stand for 
the transmittance of the position quadrature. 
( ) ( ) ( )Re Imi i iT T T= + Î   i  Transmittance of the i-th sub-channel. 
EveT   Eve’s transmittance, ( )1EveT T= -  . 
,Eve iT  Eve’s transmittance for the i-th subcarrier CV. 
W   
Variance of Eve’s EPR ancilla used in the entan-
gling cloner attack. 
( )( )0,D Î D C  
Gaussian noise of the quantum channel  , zero-
mean, circular symmetric complex Gaussian ran-
dom vector with variance ( ) †éD ùê úë= D ûDC  , and 
with quadrature components ( )20,
i i
x sD Î   , 
( )20,
i i
p sD Î   . 
i i i ix p zj¢ ¢ ¢ ¢= + = i   
Bob’s Gaussian coherent state in the phase space. 
Modeled as a zero-mean, circular symmetric 
complex Gaussian random variable 
( )20,
i
i z
z sÎ  , 22
i
iz
zs é ù= ê úë û , i i iz x p= + i , 
with quadrature components  ( )
0
20,ix wsÎ  , 
( )
0
20,ip wsÎ  , which are i.i.d. zero-mean Gaus-
sian random variables. 
( )( )F T   The CVQFT transform of transmittance matrix ( ) nÎT   , n dimensional complex vector. 
( ) ( )( )( )0,F FD Î D C  
The CVQFT transform of vector D . An n-
dimensional zero-mean, circular symmetric com-
plex Gaussian random vector, where 
( )( ) ( ) ( )†F F FD = D Dé ùê úë ûC  , and the quadra-
ture components are ( ) ( )( )20,i ix FF sD Î   , 
( ) ( )( )20,i ip FF sD Î   , where  ( )2 2Fs s<  . 
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( )( ) ( ) ( )j F F j F jé ù é ù é ù= + Dë û ë û ë ûy T d , 
1, ,j n=  .                      
An AMQD block. Formulated by n Gaussian 
subcarrier continuous variables, where j is the 
index of the AMQD block, and 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
1
1
, ,
, , ,
, , .
T
n
T
n
T
n
j y j y j
F j F d j F d j
F j F j F j
é ù é ù é ù=ë û ë û ë û
é ù é ù é ù=ë û ë û ë û
é ù é ù é ùD = D Dë û ë û ë û
y
d



 
( ) 2F jt é ù= ë ûd   
Exponentially distributed variable, 
22n wt sé ù £ë û . 
( ) 22i iF Tn s=   
Ratio of noise variance and Fourier transformed 
channel transmittance, where 
( ) 2 22 1
ik
n
n
i kk
F T T e
p-
== å i , 1i n=  . 
1Even l=  Security bound of the optimal Gaussian attack, where l  is the Lagrange coefficient. 
( ) ( )( )2 2Pr maxi il iF T l F T"W = =å  
The probability that the sum of the squared 
magnitudes of the Fourier transformed coeffi-
cients of the l Gaussian sub-channels picks up a 
maximum value. 
( ) 21 nL F T=   
Ordered list of the squared magnitudes so that 
( ) ( )2 21i iF T F T +³  and 1i in n +£ . 
( )( )2
2
1
1
Eve
Eve
W T
single
T
N
-
-
=  
Excess noise at a single-carrier transmission, 
where EveT  is Eve’s transmittance, W is the vari-
ance of the EPR-ancilla. 
( ) ( )( )
( )
21
,
21
,
1
1
Eve inn
Eve inn
W F T
AMQD
F T
N
-
-
å= å  
The excess noise in the AMQD modulation 
scheme. 
1single AMQDN Nk = ³  Ratio of single-carrier and AMQD excess noise. 
, ,tol AMQD tol singleN Na=  Tolerable excess noise in AMQD modulation, where 1xa k= ³ . 
,single AMQDh h  Single-carrier and AMQD efficiency. 
 
 
S.2  Abbreviations 
 
AMQD  Adaptive Multicarrier Quadrature Division 
AWGN  Additive White Gaussian Noise 
BS   Beam Splitter 
CV   Continuous-Variable 
CVQFT Continuous-Variable Quantum Fourier Transform 
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DR  Direct-Reconciliation 
DV   Discrete-Variable 
FFT  Fast Fourier Transform 
FWHM  Full Width at Half Maximum 
IFFT  Inverse Fast Fourier Transform 
OFDM  Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing 
RR   Reverse Reconciliation 
SNR   Signal-to-Noise Ratio 
 
